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Known unknowns and 
unknown unknowns: the 
potential and the limits of 
autonomy in disclosure of 
genetic risk
Victoria Chico
Introduction
This article considers the potential grievance that might arise where there is an unwanted 
disclosure of genetic information. Specifically, it is argued that disclosure of genetic 
information can interfere with personal autonomy. In the context of this argument a 
distinction is made between the disclosure of unknown unknowns and known unknowns.1 
An unknown unknown occurs where I have not considered the potential existence of the 
(genetic) information prior to disclosure and therefore had not declined to receive it. A 
known unknown arises where I am aware of the possible existence of (genetic) information 
and its characteristics but I am not aware of the exact content of that information. For 
example I might have directed my mind to the possibility that information about my 
risk of a particular genetic condition, say Alzheimer’s disease, has been or has possibly 
been generated but I may not want to know in figurative terms what my risk is. It is 
argued here that the knowledge that I have in the known unknown scenario makes 
it possible for me to exercise my autonomy in a way which I cannot with regard to 
unknown unknowns. Following this, assume I exercise my autonomy and decide not to 
know the particular characteristics of the information; however, someone informs me in 
any event and I am significantly aggrieved. Would I have any legal redress? Currently, 
within English law, probably not. This article considers the potential articulation of such 
a grievance within the tort of negligence. In particular it considers how a hypothetical 
English tort of negligence which is explicitly imbued with recognition of the interest in 
autonomy might respond to this claim. 
1 I am aware that this Rumsfeldian terminology has been criticised most famously by the Plain English Campaign. 
Rumsfeld was awarded the 2003 Foot in Mouth Award for his known unknown, unknown unknowns 
comment in a press briefing http://www.plainenglish.co.uk/awards/foot-in-mouth-award.html retrieved 
19/07/2012. However, others have praised his language as ‘completely straightforward’ and ‘impeccable, 
syntactically, semantically, logically, and rhetorically. There is nothing baffling about its language at all’. Geoffrey 
K Pullum Professor of General Linguistics, University of Edinburgh. (2003-12-02). “Language Log: No foot 
in mouth” retrieved 19/07/2012. See also Mark Steyn who called Rumsfeld’s quote ‘a brilliant distillation of 
quite a complex matter’. M. Steyn (December 9, 2003). ‘Rummy speaks the truth, not gobbledygook’ Daily 
Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3599959/Rummy-speaks-the-truth-not-
gobbledygook.html. Retrieved 19/07/2012.
162
01-Prof Negligence-28.3.indd   162 18/09/2012   09:31
Known unknowns and unknown unknowns
163
Autonomy and the approach to damages and duties in 
negligence
Autonomy is a multi-faceted concept. However, it seems to be constant across conceptions 
that self-direction is the central element.2 In the context of medical decisions autonomy 
finds its expression through consent. Although it might be argued that English law does 
not have a clear doctrine of informed consent,3 an obvious relationship exists between 
information and consent. Indeed, in the context of medical decision making it has long 
been recognised that a decision must be freely made with sufficient information and 
understanding if it is to be autonomous.4
The idea of self-direction which lies at the heart of autonomy relates to having 
control to shape your own life in your own way. On the face of it, to meaningfully control 
your own life you need to be aware of information about yourself which would influence 
how you exercise control. Information about personal health risks might determine how 
control is exercised. Where the individual has the personal information required for self-
determination, we protect autonomy by allowing the person to be self-determining. 
However, where personal information required for self-determination is lacking, the 
interest in autonomy is protected by providing that information. In the context of an 
unknown unknown the individual cannot be self-determining with regard to the decision 
about the disclosure of the information itself, but the disclosure provides the knowledge 
which promotes self-determination in future decisions. However, problems arise with 
regard to the relationship between information about the self and self-determination 
where the individual knows there is information to know but chooses not to know that 
information. Can the potential disclosee base the interest in not knowing this information 
on the argument that knowing it would infringe his or her autonomy? In part this might 
depend on whether the information is considered relevant. Indeed in the context of 
consent to medical treatment every possible risk need not be disclosed in order for the 
person to make an autonomous choice.5 Relevance is not a binary concept. In our daily 
lives we regularly distinguish between degrees of relevancy. In the context of information 
disclosure, information is relevant where it has a causal relationship with a decision or 
behaviour. However, the way that we are influenced by information is subjective. Thus 
information which is causally relevant to one person may not be to another. English 
law finds it difficult to account for the subjective nature of relevance in the context of 
consent to medical treatment. What physicians think will be causally relevant in patients’ 
2 See, for example, G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988)Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press); R. Young, ‘The Value of Autonomy’ 32 (1982) The Philosophical Quarterly 35; L. Waddell-Ekstrom, 
‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993) 599; J. Christman, 
‘Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of Autonomy’ 99 (1988) Ethics 109 and R. 
Young, ‘Autonomy and Socialization’ 356 (1980) Mind 567. 
3 See the development of the law on non-disclosure of risks in medical treatment from Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871; Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare 
NHS Trust [1998] 48 BMLR 118; Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 and Birch v UCL NHS Foundation Trust 
[2008] EWHC 2237.
4 S. Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (2011 3rd edition London: Sweet & Maxwell) 115.
5 See, for example, Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 
871; Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1998] 48 BMLR 118.
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decisions often does not accord with patients’ opinions.6 Furthermore, a patient focused 
test7 is unlikely to be nuanced enough to take account of the ways that different patients 
might be influenced by the particular information. Thus adopting some objective position 
which reflects people’s views on what information is relevant is inherently difficult. Given 
this where the opportunity for individuals to determine themselves what they deem to be 
relevant is lacking, any information which says something reliable about those individuals 
has the potential to be relevant. Autonomy is then about all personal information rather 
than some personal information. People may get some information that has no causal 
effect with regard to changing actions or decisions, but this information is still relevant 
because being causally implicated in choosing not to change your behaviour or not to 
make different decisions based on particular information requires having that information. 
Where information is not disclosed, the responsibility for not realising options based on 
the information rests with nature or whoever withheld the information rather than the 
person whom the information is about.8 
Recognition of autonomy in the tort of negligence
Damage is the gist of the action in negligence.9 Historically, physical, and more recently, 
tangible damage are exclusively the types of damage which tort law recognises.10 The 
further the perceived adverse outcome is from this corporeal paradigm the more difficult 
it becomes to refer to it as damage in negligence.11 Disrespecting the interest in autonomy 
does not fit within the current parameters of damage in negligence. It is simply not seen 
as equivalent to the tangible damage that tort law recognises. Despite this the interest 
in autonomy is well recognised within the tort of trespass to the person,12 and in the 
jurisprudence relating to Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.13 
However,the increasing importance of autonomy appears to have had an effect in two 
fairly recent House of Lords negligence cases. In Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital 
NHS Trust,14 and Chester v Afshar15 their Lordships demonstrated a tentative willingness 
to provide redress for negligently inflicted damage to autonomy interests. In Rees the 
House awarded compensation to Ms Rees based on the birth of her healthy son, despite 
6 See, for example, Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 
871; Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1998] 48 BMLR 118; Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 and 
Birch v UCL NHS Foundation Trust [2008] EWHC 2237.
7 Like that discussed by Lord Bridge in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital [1985] AC 871, 900 and Lord Woolf MR in Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1998] 48 
BMLR 118, 123.
8 For support see T. Hurka, ‘Why Value Autonomy?’ 13 (1987) Social Theory and Practice 361, 366. 
9 J. Stapleton, ‘The Gist of Negligence. Part I: Minimum Actionable Damage’ 104 (1988) Law Quarterly Review 
213.
10 Thanks are due to one of the anonymous reviewers for providing a form of words which brought clarity to this 
point. 
11 N. Priaulx, ‘Joy to the World! A (Healthy) Child is Born! Reconceptualizing ‘Harm’ in Wrongful Conception 
13 (2004) Social and Legal Studies 5, rendering an interpretation of J. Feinburg, Harm to Others Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (1984) 33. 
12 See for example, Re B Adult: Refusal of Medical treatment) [2002] 2 FCR 1; 1090; St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust 
v S [1998] 3 WLR 936; R v Collins Ex p S (No. 2) [1999] Fam 26.
13 See for example, NHS Trust A v M, NHS Trust B v H [2001] Fam 348; R (On the Application of Purdy) v DPP 
[2009] UKHL 45, Lord Hope, 34-43.
14 [2004] 1 AC 309.
15 [2005] 1 AC 134.
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the fact that in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board16 it had refused to recognise the birth of 
a healthy child as damage. Their Lordships sidestepped McFarlane by awarding Ms Rees 
a ‘conventional sum’ which, rather than reflecting the costs of raising her child, was 
intended to compensate for the interference with her autonomy.17
Shortly after Rees the House of Lords again indicated that interference with the 
interest in autonomy might be recognised as a form of ‘damage’ within the tort of 
negligence. In Chester v Afshar a surgeon, Mr Afshar, negligently failed to inform Miss 
Chester of the risk of paralysis inherent in spinal surgery. When Miss Chester suffered 
paralysis she claimed that she would not have had the operation on that occasion but 
that she would probably have had it at some point in the future. Miss Chester could not, 
therefore, overcome the traditional ‘but-for’ test for factual causation. Despite this, the 
majority held that she should be compensated, on the basis that the law should protect 
the patient’s right to make informed choices about medical treatment.18 Lord Steyn said:
‘A rule requiring a doctor to abstain from performing an operation without 
the informed consent of a patient …..ensures that due respect is given to the 
autonomy and dignity of each patient.19’
These cases demonstrate some willingness to recognise that autonomy is an interest which 
deserves some legal protection in the tort of negligence.20
The interest in autonomy which is protected by not knowing genetic information 
has been recognised by two international instruments which are credited with playing a 
crucial role in establishing rights in the genetic context.21 Article 10(2) of the Council of 
Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states:
‘Everyone is entitled to know any information collected about his or her health. 
However, the wishes of individuals not to be so informed shall be observed.’
Similarly, Article 5c of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights states:
‘The right of every individual to decide whether or not to be informed of 
the results of genetic examination and the resulting consequences should be 
respected.’
This international recognition of the interest in not knowing and the tentative willingness 
of our senior judges to recognise that breach of autonomy might deserve some protection 
16 [2000] 2 AC 59.
17 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309, Lord Millett 349.
18 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, Lord Hope 162; Lord Walker 164; Lord Steyn 144.
19 Ibid Lord Steyn 144. 
20 Compensatory damages are awarded for loss. However, in these two cases the nature of the loss was not clear. The 
loss which was compensated was not a direct result of the breach of the interest that the House explicitly recognised 
as requiring vindication. It might be argued that in these cases the House was awarding vindicatory damages. This 
raises important questions about tort law as a means of vindicating rights rather than compensating loss. In a recent 
case the Supreme Court declined to award vindicatory damages for false imprisonment. Furthermore, the majority 
doubted whether such a head of damages actually existed. Thanks go to one of the anonymous reviewers for 
raising this issue. See Walumba Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12.
21 G. Laurie, ‘Genetics and Patients’ Rights: Where are the Limits?’ 5 (2000) Medical Law International 25, 26. 
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in negligence indicates that there is potential for English law to recognise that a person 
can be harmed by receipt of information that he or she did not want.
In negligence the definition and categorisation of damage tends to be dealt with 
under the concept of duty of care.22 If interference with autonomy through disclosure of 
genetic information is recognised as harm in negligence, a corresponding duty might be 
imposed on those in a position to disclose genetic information not to cause that harm. 
Health professionals could be subject to such a duty. In order to fulfil a duty, the person 
who owes the duty must know what fulfilment entails. Foreseeability is the key here. 
Whilst people might be able to foresee harm when their actions may cause physical harm, 
they may not be able to foresee whether a particular action will breach autonomy because 
people are likely to react, and interpret its impact upon their autonomy, differently. This is 
particularly true with regard to the question of knowing or not knowing personal genetic 
information. Here it is not the case that one or the other of the particular situations (knowing 
or not knowing) is seen as detrimental per se; it depends on the particular individual and 
his or her desires regarding receipt of genetic information. Thus the question of whether 
damage has occurred depends not only on what takes place but also on the individual’s 
attitude to it.23 This means that what amounts to damage in some cases might not amount 
to damage in others. Indeed some situations which many people would consider to be 
beneficial might be considered to be deleterious to a particular individual.24 The question 
is whether the tort of negligence is equipped to recognise a particular result as damaging 
when that result would not be uniformly perceived as harmful? In terms of the imposition 
of a duty of care, a crucial issue here is likely to be whether the potential defendant could 
have foreseen that this particular individual would perceive the particular outcome as 
deleterious. There may be a pre-tort relationship between the parties in which the explicit 
or implicit actions of the potential claimant indicate that she will perceive a particular 
result as damaging even though the majority of people would not view the result in this 
way. Indeed, the potential claimant may have sought out the potential defendant to help 
him or her to avoid that result.25 In these circumstances even though the foreseeability of 
harm would depend on individual desires, it is clear beforehand what the person’s desires 
are making it possible, practically, to impose achievable duties.
If autonomy is upheld by respecting a person’s decisions and actions irrespective of their 
content, this element of foreseeability might be achievable in relation to known unknowns.26 
However, it is not achievable in relation to unknown unknowns.27 In relation to the latter a 
duty to protect autonomy could only rest on a conception of autonomy which has objective 
substance and does not simply rest on fulfilling individual desires. In this case it would be 
clear to the person charged with the duty how they might discharge it. Indeed negligence 
22 For explicit judicial pronouncements of this fact see, for example, Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 59 
ALJR 564 Brennan J 564, 590; Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, Lord Bridge 618, 627 and Lord 
Oliver 651. 
23 D. Nolan, ‘New Forms of Damage in Negligence’ 70 (2007) Modern Law Review 59, 71–77.
24 This is demonstrated in the claims arising from unwanted pregnancies. 
25 For example where an individual has approached a surgeon for a sterilisation/contraception it is clear to the 
surgeon that she will not view a subsequent pregnancy as beneficial. Another example might be where parents 
approach a fertility clinic to assist them to bear a saviour sibling for an existing sick child. When providing this 
service the clinic test the tissue type of the embryos the parents produce through IVF and select one that matches 
the tissue type of the existing child. The parents might not view a pregnancy (or the birth of the child) as beneficial 
if they subsequently discover that the medical team carelessly transferred an embryo with the wrong tissue type.
26 Where the individual has expressed her desire not to be informed.
27 Where the individual was not previously aware there was something to know.
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law is premised on objectivity. Thus the law might find it easier to recognise new forms 
of damage if they are objectively determined. However, this raises many questions with 
regard to recognising breach of autonomy as damage because autonomy is characteristically 
a subjective value. However, let us consider whether we can construct conceptions of 
autonomy which have an element of objectivity such that the law might be able to gain the 
analytical purchase required to recognise breach of autonomy as damage. Two potential 
options are analysed in the section below: the concept of an objective idea of what people 
want to know and the idea that knowing is fundamental to autonomy such that the concept 
of autonomy always requires knowing and cannot, therefore, justify not knowing. 
Autonomy and the interest in not knowing an unknown 
unknown
Where it is not known whether someone wants to know information about his or her 
genetic risks, the argument that non disclosure is justified by the concept of autonomy 
may be based on the idea that there are clear patterns in what people generally want to 
know and do not want to know. If this is the case, we can know what an individual 
would want simply from the nature of the information. The problem with this is that it 
seems to remove the element of self-determination which was argued above to be the 
central unifying principle of autonomy. Nevertheless let us consider this prospect in more 
detail. Assume we are dealing with a clear cut scenario where one option is particularly 
terrible such that it is reasonable to assume that almost everyone would choose the same 
thing. Here it might be possible to justify adopting a course of action in relation to a 
particular individual on the basis of autonomy because acting in that way towards them 
would mimic their self-determinative action. In effect we would be saying we know they 
would choose to act in this way so we will act in this way to protect their autonomy. 
28 Of course this raises the question of what such a clear cut situation might be. But 
duties in negligence already rest on the basis that no one would want to be physically, 
mentally or financially harmed by another’s negligence. Indeed Mullender argues that 
the protective purpose of the tort of negligence maintains a commitment to the ideal of 
personal autonomy. 29 The question is whether such certainties can also be stated in the 
context of knowing and not knowing personal genetic information.30 
In terms of certainties, it might be argued that practically everyone would want to 
know about a particular genetic risk if they could access simple, effective prophylactic 
treatment.31 But short of this it is difficult to be certain about what people generally would 
28 Furthermore, it becomes difficult to distinguish between autonomy and welfare here.
29 R. Mullender, English Negligence Law as a Human Practice 21 (2009) Law and Literature 321, 324–325.
30 This, of course, goes to the heart of the issue of foreseeability of harm in the context of the disclosure of genetic 
information discussed above on pages 5–6.
31 The uptake rate for predictive genetic testing for familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP) is around 80%. D.G.R. 
Evans, E.R. Maher, R. MacLean, D.R. Davies and D. Craufurd, ‘Uptake of Genetic Testing for Cancer 
Predisposition – Ethical Issues’ 34 (1997) Journal of Medical Genetics 746. This condition can be prevented 
prophylactically by surgically removing the colon. This is a significant undertaking but despite this there is still a 
high uptake rate. If treatment were much simpler, the uptake rate might be higher. Moreover, the rate of uptake 
should not be taken as a direct indicator of people’s desire to know about their risk per se. People might have 
a greater desire to know information that already exists about them than they might to confirm a risk that they 
are already aware of. That is, people with dominant autosomal genetic conditions such as Huntington’s Chorea 
and FAP will already be aware of their risk because of their families history. Taking a test themselves will add 
certainty to the already known risk. 
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and would not want to know about their genetic risks. Whilst some people might not 
want information concerning unavoidable risks, others may be eager to know all they can 
so that they can prepare. The uptake of predictive testing for Huntington’s Disease, for 
which there is currently no treatment, is relatively low,32 (around 5–25 per cent in the 
UK and elsewhere),33 but it is not insignificant enough to justify a wholesale conclusion 
that people do not want to know. Furthermore, evidence demonstrates an uptake rate 
of around 50 per cent in testing for many genetic conditions which can be managed but 
not cured.34 Of course people who access predictive genetic testing will usually already be 
aware of their elevated risk because of their family history. The test confirms the presence 
or absence of the gene. Given this, the evidence of uptake rates here is not directly 
indicative of what people would want to be told ‘out of the blue’ in terms of risks of 
which they were not previously aware. However, there is no specific evidence indicating 
what people want to be informed of ‘out of the blue’ so the uptake rates for predictive 
testing are the only relevant indicators of desires in this context. The equivocal nature of 
the evidence of uptake rates makes it impossible to make generalisations which purport to 
reflect self-determination about when people would and would not want to know about 
their genetic risks.
This moves us on to our second line of thought concerning the preservation of 
autonomy in relation to unknown unknowns. If self-determination is the crux of autonomy, 
where self-determination is impossible, an objective position may be established where 
autonomy is protected by maximising future opportunities for self-determination. 
Some philosophers argue that a crucial aspect of autonomy is the possession of 
information which enables meaningful self-determination.35 According to Aristotle ‘all 
men desire to know’.36 Similarly Harris and Keywood argue that there is a normal and 
reasonable presumption of a relationship between information and autonomy.37 Others 
agree that relevant information is crucial in forming autonomous desires and making 
32 When compared to conditions for which there is some treatment or avoidance strategy.
33 M.R. Hayden, ‘Predictive Testing for Huntington’s Disease: The Calm After the Storm’ 356 (2000) The 
Lancet 1944. As Hayden acknowledges, this was significantly less than the 70–80 per cent uptake that had been 
predicted before testing was available. 
34 This rate of uptake provides little assistance in determining what the majority of ordinary people might want 
to know, thereby providing little assistance in pouring content into the concept of objective autonomy. See, 
for example, I. Christiaans, E. Birnie, G.J. Bonsel, A.A.M. Wilde and I.M. van Langen, ‘Uptake of Genetic 
Counselling and Predictive DNA Testing in Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy’ 16 (2008) European Journal of 
Human Genetics 1201, this study demonstrated that the uptake for predictive genetic testing for hypertrophic 
cardiomyopathy after detection of the causal mutation in the proband was 39 per cent. Prevention of sudden 
cardiac death in patients with a high risk by means of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator is effective in 
this condition; M.E. Ropka, J. Wenzel, E.K. Phillips, M. Siadaty and J.T. Philbrick, ‘Uptake Rates for Breast 
Cancer Genetic Testing: A Systematic Review’ 15 (2006) Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers & Prevention 840, 
where a systematic review of 40 studies revealed a real uptake rate of 59 per cent of various forms of predictive 
testing for breast cancer.
35 J. Harris and K. Keywood, ‘Ignorance, Information and Autonomy’ 22 (2001) Theoretical Medicine 415; 
R. Rhodes, ‘Genetic Links, Family Ties, and Social Bonds: Rights and Responsibilities in the Face of Genetic 
Knowledge’ 23 (1998) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10; For an account of how autonomy is not necessarily 
restricted by a lack of information see J. S Taylor, ‘Autonomy and Informed Consent a Much Misunderstood 
Relationship’ 38 (2004) The Journal of Value Inquiry 383 L.O. Ursin, ‘Personal Autonomy and Informed Consent 
12 (2009) Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy 17; G. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control’ 6 (1976) 
Hastings Center Report 23.
36 W.D. Ross, (ed.) Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici Elenchii (1958 Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1. 
37 J. Harris and K. Keywood, ‘Ignorance, Information and Autonomy’ 22 (2001) Theoretical Medicine 415, 417. 
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autonomous choices.38 For Harris and Keywood autonomy finds expression through the 
law of consent, where the emphasis is firmly on the provision of relevant information.39 
Consent, where one is capable of it, is vitiated when it is ill-informed.40 Failures to provide 
adequate information regarding the risks of, or the nature of, medical treatment are 
actionable in negligence and battery respectively. Traditionally the doctrine of therapeutic 
privilege allowed doctors to discretionally withhold information from patients where it 
was thought that the disclosure would harm the patient. However, General Medical 
Council (GMC) guidance suggests that in modern medicine this privilege is confined to 
very narrow circumstances, where disclosure would cause ‘serious harm’ which excludes 
the patient becoming upset, or refusing treatment.41 Thus, the contemporary assumption 
is that the patient wants, and can cope with, the relevant information and that it should 
be disclosed to allow competent patients to form autonomous desires and choices.42 In the 
genetic information scenario where it is not known that there is information to be known, 
the opportunity for self-determination does not arise. In the circumstances it might be 
argued that autonomy would be maximised by facilitating future self-determination. 
Disclosure would provide information about the self which could enable future self-
determination. Thus, in relation to unknown unknowns, if health professionals were 
under a duty to protect the autonomy of those whose genetic information they come 
into contact with, they would discharge this duty by disclosing the information.43 An 
aggrieved individual might subsequently argue that he or she would rather not have 
38 See, for example, R. Rhodes, ‘Genetic Links, Family Ties, and Social Bonds: Rights and Responsibilities in 
the Face of Genetic Knowledge’ 23 (1998) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10, 17–18; G. Laurie, ‘The Most 
Personal Information of All: An Appraisal of Genetic Privacy in the Shadow of the Human Genome Project’ 10 
(1996) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 74, 87; G. Laurie, ‘Protecting and Promoting Privacy in 
an Uncertain World: Further Defences of Ignorance and the Right not to Know’ (2000) 7 European Journal of 
Health Law 185, 189.
39 J. Harris and K. Keywood, ‘Ignorance, Information and Autonomy’ 22 (2001) Theoretical Medicine 415, 417.
40 J. Harris, The Value of Life (1985 London: Routledge) Chapter Ten. 
41  General Medical Council, Consent, Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together London, 2008, paragraph 16.
42 Although historically there might have been a tendency on behalf of the medical profession to withhold 
information from patients, on the basis that the patient might be too naïve or sensitive to cope with that 
information, this position is now generally accepted as being unduly paternalistic. 
43  Of course one of the major problems with imposing a duty here is that English negligence law does not usually 
impose liability for pure omissions. Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd. [1987] AC 241 Lord Goff 271. One area 
of English law which falls within the context of omissions is liability for the acts of third parties. An analogy 
might be drawn between this area of law and the situation considered here. It is assumed here that the reason the 
health professional is aware of the particular person’s genetic risk is because of a test they have performed on the 
person’s relative. Although this scenario might not be about controlling the third party as such, this body of law 
might be relevant for its take on special relationships in this tripartite scenario. Exceptions to the rule that there 
is no liability for the actions of others have been carved out in the context of special relationships where there 
is proximity imported by control or a special relationship Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970] AC 1004. 
So far the English courts have been unwilling to impose liability where they do not consider there is no duty to 
control which can be relied on to establish a clear special relationship between the defendant and the third party 
or the defendant and the claimant. See Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 and Palmer v Tees 
HA [2000] PIQR P1. However, I have argued elsewhere that identifiability of risk might be a more suitable 
than control as a basis for imposing liability on health professionals for omissions with regard to information 
disclosure. V. Chico Genomic Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis for Novel Negligence Claims Generated 
by Genetic Technology (2011) Routledge Cavendish 161–170. In the USA there is a fairly well developed body 
of law concerning the failure to disclose information about medical, including genetic, risks which does not rely 
on an element of control to found a special relationship. See in particular Tarasoff v Regents of the University of 
California 551 P.2d 334 (Cal 1976), Pate v Threlkel 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995) and Safer v Pack A. 2d 1188 (NJ 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) and again the argument I have made previously in V. Chico Genomic Negligence: 
An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis for Novel Negligence Claims Generated by Genetic Technology (2011) Routledge 
Cavendish 161–170.
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had that information; however, the disclosure cannot amount to an interference with 
autonomy, because autonomy is protected through the promotion of self-knowledge and 
the opportunity for future self-determination. Given that self-determination with regard 
to the instant decision is impossible, from this perspective, there could then be no duty 
on healthcare professionals to ensure non-disclosure which could be justified by recourse 
to the principle of autonomy. 
Autonomy and the interest in not knowing a known 
unknown
Although it has been argued here that the interest in not knowing an unknown unknown 
cannot be justified by recourse to the principle of autonomy, it might be argued that the 
interest in not knowing a known unknown can be justified on this basis.44 Assume that 
an individual has stipulated, in a way readily discoverable by health professionals, that 
he or she does not want to know information about elevated genetic risks. However, 
ignoring this direction, a health professional informs the individual of his or her elevated 
risk which the professional is aware of because of a genetic test performed on a relative. 
Here there is a prior choice not to be informed, which represents the individual’s 
wishes.
Autonomy and substantive rationality
Where the individual has expressed a wish not to know specific genetic information, 
he or she is aware that there is information, or potential information to know as well as 
the nature of that information, in essence then he or she knows what it is that remains 
unknown. Does the individual possess the knowledge about him or herself sufficient for 
self-determination in these circumstances? At the very least the individual has directed his 
or her mind to the issue in deciding not to have the information. Nevertheless, following 
on from the above argument45 we could claim that a refusal of information can never 
be justified on the basis of autonomy because lack of information prevents meaningful 
self-determination.46 On this basis, the health professional would not interfere with 
the individual’s autonomy in disclosing the information even if this is contrary to the 
recipient’s expressed wishes because only acceptances of information are autonomous. 
Rhodes argues that the interest in not knowing cannot be based on autonomy 
where the information is relevant to making rational decisions. She links the concept of 
rationality to the reasonable person and the information which that person would want 
to know. She says:
44 See for example G. Laurie, ‘The Most Personal Information of All: An Appraisal of Genetic Privacy in the 
Shadow of the Human Genome Project’ 10 (1006) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 74; G. Laurie, 
‘Obligations Arising from Genetic Information – Negligence and the Protection of Familial Interests’ 11 (1999) 
Child and Family Law Quarterly; G. Laurie, ‘Genetics and Patients’ Rights: Where are the Limits?’ 5 (2000) 
Medical Law International 25; G. Laurie, Protecting and Promoting Privacy in an Uncertain World: Further 
Defences of Ignorance and the Right Not to Know’ 7 (2000) European Journal of Health Law 185; G. Laurie, 
Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms (2002 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
45 Made in relation to unknown unknowns.
46 A concept put forward here as a unifying central element in conceptions of autonomy. 
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‘I am obligated to make thoughtful and informed decisions without being 
swayed by irrational emotions including my fear of knowing significant 
genetic facts about myself. When I recognize that I am ethically required 
to be autonomous, I must also see that since autonomous action requires 
being informed of what a reasonable person would want to know under the 
circumstance, I am ethically required to be informed.’ 
This suggests that a refusal to receive genetic information which reasonable people 
would want to know cannot be justified on the basis of autonomy because it is not 
rational, and rationality is a precondition of autonomy. Let us put aside the objection 
that rationality and reasonableness are not the same thing. From a legal perspective, if 
the courts were minded to protect autonomy with regard to the disclosure of genetic 
information, they might find that the notion of the reasonable person provides a legally 
workable basis upon which to recognise both the interest in knowing and the interest 
in not knowing. However, the (legal) concept of the reasonable person is a fiction – an 
artificial judicial creation which, historically, has been relied on to limit the instances 
in which an action might amount to breach of duty.47 However, the law is a practical 
animal. If the law is not practical it has utterly failed.48 Thus the law needs tools to fulfil 
its practical function and the standard of the reasonable person is a tool which enables 
this practical function. 
Objectivity is the core feature of the reasonable person. In the context of breach of 
duty the law assumes the baseline of the careful person. However, the courts have, more 
recently, relied on the concept of the reasonable person to determine whether a particular 
outcome ought to be considered damaging and therefore whether people should be under 
a duty not to cause that particular outcome.49 Whilst some of our judiciary might question 
how realistic it is to use objective standards to determine what is harmful,50 objectivity 
seems to remain a core feature of their analysis.51 With respect to breach of duty, we can 
see that having a subjective test whereby the defendant must prove that he or she acted 
to the best of his or her own judgment would be impractical. It would ‘leave so vague a 
line as to afford no rule at all, the degree of judgment belonging to each individual being 
infinitely various’.52 The practical implication of this would be that people’s protection 
from negligence would depend on the judgment of the particular tortfeasor. If standards 
operated in such a way, victims of perceived carelessness would be treated inequitably. 
Furthermore, people might be unwilling to put themselves in the care of others if they 
could not be confident that baseline standards would be met. 
47 Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448; Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co. [1856] 11 Ex Ch 781, Alderson 
B, 784.
48 C. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law Oxford: Hart, 2009, 
13.
49 In McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 where Lord Steyn thought it was relevant to ask commuters 
on the Underground the following question: ‘Should the parents of an unwanted but healthy child be able to 
sue the doctor or hospital for compensation equivalent to the cost of bringing up the child for the years of his 
or her minority, i.e. until about 18 years?. More recently Lord Hope showed concern about the ability to make 
realistic assessments about what reasonable people would consider harmful in a pluralistic society Chester v Afshar 
[2005] 1 AC 134.
50 See, for example, Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 Lord Hope 161–162.
51 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 Lord Steyn 82, Parkinson v St James and Seacroft NHS [2002] 
QB 266Hospital.
52 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bng NC 468, 475; 132 ER 490. 493 (Yindal CJ).
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The same levels of infinite variability and uncertainty are not present when 
determining the standard of what amounts to harm. Some circumstances will be viewed 
almost universally as harmful; such as those concerning corporeal injuries. However, it 
might be argued that some people will view circumstances which others would deem a 
benefit as harmful. This position was discussed in relation to pregnancy above. Where a 
person has done something to indicate that he or she will view circumstances normally 
considered beneficial as harmful, the circumstances and the way he or she will perceive it 
are not ambiguous or uncertain. 
The value of personal autonomy is, on the face of it, a subjective value which refers 
to the ability to be your own person to live your life according to your own reasons and 
motives. The problem with an objective approach based on rules and norms,53 is that it 
does not reflect people’s real experiences in a way which a subjective inquiry into minds 
and facts might. Indeed this tension between the subjective nature of the concept of 
autonomy and the objective basis of the reasonable person, as a means of determining what 
is harmful in negligence, makes it difficult to envisage how the standard of the reasonable 
person might be used to determine when a disclosure of genetic information would or 
would not amount to an interference with autonomy which might be recognised by the 
law.54 
Harris and Keywood agree with the argument that self-determination or self-
government is central to autonomy. However, they take a line similar to Rhodes and 
argue that refusals of genetic information cannot be considered to be autonomous because 
they are not rational.55 They adopt a conception of autonomy which involves the exercise 
of control, and argue that ignorance of crucial information is inimical to autonomy 
because it interferes with the ability to control one’s own destiny. They argue that control 
rather than choice defines self-government and information is crucial to control. They 
then link the concept of rationality to the principle of self-government arguing that:
‘…. where the individual is ignorant of information that bears upon rational 
life choices she is not in a position to be self-governing. If I lack information, 
for example about how long my life is likely to continue I cannot make rational 
plans for the rest of my life.56’
On this analysis only, decisions which provide for future rationality are autonomous. 
Thus, in order to make rational life choices in the future, you need to accept relevant 
information in the present. It seems that the concept of relevance assumes a central role 
in Harris and Keywood’s perception of whether decisions can be rationally made without 
certain information and correspondingly whether that information can thus be rationally 
refused. 
Information is certainly relevant to a decision where that information causes a 
particular outcome. For example, giving a person information might lead him or her 
to seek prophylactic treatment which he or she would otherwise have been unaware of 
the need for. However, as discussed above, relevance does not only relate to a change 
in outcome. Hurka argues that autonomy involves choice from a range of options. Thus 
53 Which it is argued here is likely to be favoured by English negligence law.
54 I owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer of this article for this argument.
55 J. Harris and K. Keywood, ‘Ignorance, Information and Autonomy’ 22 (2001) Theoretical Medicine 415.
56 Ibid 421.
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giving a person a choice of ten options respects autonomy in a way which providing 
him or her with only the highest-ranked choice, the one he or she would have chosen 
anyway, does not. This, Hurka argues, is because of the individual’s causal responsibility 
for the non-realisation of the other options.57 Where all ten options are available and the 
individual chooses option A, he or she is causally responsible for choosing not option B, 
C, D etc. However, where the individual is only presented with the preferred option A, 
the causal responsibility for the non-realisation of options B, C, D etc effectively rests 
with the person who chose not to provide the other options. From this perspective, 
even where the individual chooses to maintain the status quo upon receiving genetic 
information – that is, continue with the only option which he or she was aware of 
prior to the information disclosure – he or she is causally responsible for not choosing 
the other options which have become open to him or her through the disclosure of 
the information. In other words, the disclosure of the genetic information makes the 
person aware of the need to consider options which he or she may not have been aware 
of in genetic ignorance and, therefore, makes him or her causally responsible for their 
rejection. On this basis, all genetic information which has significance58 to a particular 
person assumes relevance to that person, rather than only that information that would 
make him or her act differently. 
On this account of rational autonomy, it follows that a disclosure of genetic 
information about an individual to that individual against his or will does not interfere 
with her autonomy because his or her refusal to receive relevant information was neither 
rational nor, therefore, autonomous. The concept of autonomy obtains an objective 
character here. The objective position is that only failures to disclose relevant genetic 
information would interfere with autonomy. The law might find it easier to recognise 
that breach of autonomy amounts to harm where only failures to disclose information 
could lead to that harm because the circumstances when the harm can occur will be 
clearer, consequently making it obvious when a person’s actions will amount to a breach 
of duty. The problem here is separating out the instant and future decisions. From this 
perspective, the rationality of the present decision to refuse genetic information hinges on 
the rationality of future decisions as assessed by the ability to control and self-determine 
those future decisions via the relevant information. However, where the individual 
knows the characteristics of the information he or she is refusing, it might be argued that 
he or she is in a position to self-determine in relation to the instant decision because he 
or she has all the information which is relevant in making this particular decision. That 
is, the individual knows the characteristics of the information; what he or she does not 
want to know is the particular level of risk which is contained in that information. If 
this decision can be considered rational and autonomous because the required element 
of control exists, why should assessments about opportunities for future control and self-
determination affect the ability to be self-determining in the current decision? 
Does the problem with the lack of knowledge about the self when refusing genetic 
information relate to the refusal of the information itself? That is, the individual does not 
have sufficient knowledge of the content of the information to make a self-determined 
decision to refuse it. Or rather than the level of knowledge upon which the refusal to 
receive the genetic information is based, is the problem that the refusal of knowledge 
57 T. Hurka, ‘Why Value Autonomy?’ 13 (1987) Social Theory and Practice 361, 362 and 366.
58 In that the information is reliable telling us something about that particular individual’s risk. 
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about the self, although self-determined in this instance because the individual has some 
knowledge which has enabled him or her to make a decision, is problematic because it 
prevents opportunities to self-determine in the future?59 In other words, from a perspective 
which holds that knowledge about the self is crucial to self-determination, the problem 
with refusing information about oneself could rest on the fact that the very refusal is not 
based on sufficient knowledge about the self and therefore it cannot be an exercise of self-
determination. Or the problem in terms of the protection of autonomy may not be with 
the level of knowledge available in the making of the instant decision to refuse genetic 
information. Instead, it may be that the case that any refusal of such information cannot 
be justified on the basis of autonomy, even if the refusal itself is sufficiently informed to 
be an exercise of self-determination. 
In the context of the refusal of specific genetic information, it might be argued that 
where an individual has made an explicit decision to refuse information he or she has 
clearly considered the possibility of the existence of that information and the personal 
impact of knowing that information. It is arguable that this level of knowledge about 
the self is sufficient to self-determinedly refuse the information. However, from the 
perspective that rationality is a condition of autonomy that necessitates knowing relevant 
information, an autonomous decision to refuse information about the self is not possible 
because autonomy supports the giving rather than the withholding of information.60 
Thus, the issue is not that the individual is not self-determining in this instance but that 
a refusal of genetic information here will diminish the potential for self-determination 
in the future. So the question is can a self-determining refusal of information ever be 
justified by autonomy where it will impede future self-determination? Put otherwise, 
can we autonomously restrict our autonomy? The information as autonomy camp would 
argue that we cannot. For them autonomy is not content-neutral. Only a choice to 
accept relevant information would be deemed autonomous. However, we can contend 
that rationality as a condition of autonomy does not relate to rational ends but to the 
rationality of the procedure that the decision-maker carries out to achieve those ends. 
That is, the end in itself does not need to demonstrate a particular value but the procedure 
needs to be a valid means of reaching ends which are independently desired.
Autonomy and procedural rationality
According to Dworkin, autonomy is a procedural concept that is characterised by the 
formula: authenticity + independence = autonomy.61 In essence, this means that the 
autonomous person is one who does his own thing.62 This requires an analysis of what 
it is for a motivation to be his and what it is for it to be his own.63 The former relates 
to authenticity and the latter to independence.64 In defining authenticity, Dworkin 
59 For example treatments or other benefits might emerge which the individual does not have the opportunity to 
choose because she does not know they are applicable to her. 
60 J. Harris and K. Keywood, ‘Ignorance, Information and Autonomy’ 22 (2001) Theoretical Medicine 415, 432.
61 G. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control’ 6 (1976) Hastings Center Report 23, 24; G. Dworkin, The 
Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Chapter 1.
62 G. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control’ 6 (1976) Hastings Center Report 23, 24 (original emphasis).
63 Ibid 24.
64 Ibid 24. See, also J. Feinberg, ‘Autonomy’ in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy J. Christman (ed.) 
(1989) Oxford: Oxford University Press; R. Young, ‘Autonomy and The Inner Self’ in The Inner Citadel: Essays 
on Individual Autonomy J. Christman (ed.) (1989 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 79.
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distinguishes between first and second order desires and argues that authentic actions 
require the ability to raise the question of whether one identifies with the motivations 
for those actions.65 For example, one may be motivated by jealousy or anger but desire 
that one’s motivations be different.66 In other words, people are capable of wanting to be 
different in their preferences and purposes from what they actually are.67 Thus, authenticity 
relates to the individual’s ability to critically analyse his or her first order motivations and 
change them if he or she wishes; it is not related to specific ends.68
Whilst authenticity is necessary for autonomy, Dworkin argues that it is not sufficient 
because a person’s motivational structure might be his or hers without being his or her 
own.69 This may be because the identification with motivations has been influenced in 
a decisive way by others. Dworkin calls this lack of procedural independence.70 It does 
not automatically follow that any interference with an individual’s motivational structure 
prevents procedural independence, such that his or her decisions cannot be considered 
to be his or her own. Indeed, Dworkin devotes significant attention to distinguishing 
between those interferences which prevent the individual’s decision from being his or her 
own and those which do not:
‘With respect to autonomy conceived of as authenticity under conditions of 
procedural independence, the paradigms of interference are manipulation and 
deception, and the analytic task is to distinguish these ways of influencing 
people’s higher order judgements from those (education, requirements of 
logical thinking, provision of role models) which do not negate procedural 
independence.71’
If authenticity concerns the ability to reflect critically on first order motivations, methods 
which prevent such reflection will prevent procedural independence. Dworkin argues that 
it is a feature of persons that they are able to reflect on their decisions, motives, desires, 
habits and so forth.72 Thus, influencing people’s higher order judgments through education 
and the provision of role models does not negate procedural independence because they do 
not affect the ability to critically reflect on motivations. Although manipulative methods 
such as threats and physical force might not interfere with the knowledge that a particular 
determinant is influencing behaviour, they may affect the ability to critically reflect on 
that influence, thereby frustrating procedural independence. Furthermore, subconscious 
methods of influencing motivation such as subliminal motivation, or the destruction 
of parts of the brain necessary for performing the critical reflection which authenticity 
requires, also interfere with procedural independence because the individual does not 
65 G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 15; Others also 
support this approach, see, for example, F. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. 
(1988 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); J. Feinberg, Autonomy in The Inner Citadel: Individual Essays 
on Personal Autonomy J. Christman (ed.) (1989 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 36–38 on moral authenticity.
66 G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 15.
67 H. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ in The Inner Citadel: Individual Essays on 
Personal Autonomy J Christman (ed.) (1989 Oxford: Oxford University Press) 64. 
68 Such as the acceptance of relevant information considered here. 
69 G. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control’ 6 (1976) Hastings Center Report 23, 25.
70 Ibid 25.
71 Ibid 26.
72 Ibid 23, 24; See also G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988 Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 15. 
01-Prof Negligence-28.3.indd   175 18/09/2012   09:31
Professional Negligence, Vol. 28 No. 3, 2012
176
know the real reasons for his or her actions, and therefore, cannot reflect on those reasons 
and make a favourable or adverse judgment concerning them.73
In line with this Dworkin acknowledges that procedural independence may be 
interfered with where the individual is unaware of relevant facts.74 However, he goes on 
to argue that a person who authentically wishes that his or her procedural independence 
be restricted in certain ways, can act in a procedurally independent manner in renouncing 
procedural independence such that he or she has acted authentically, and autonomously 
restricted his or her autonomy.75
He says:
‘…a person might decide to renounce his independence of action or thought 
because he wants (genuinely) to be that sort of person. A person might do 
whatever his mother, or his government, tells him to do, and do so in a 
procedurally independent manner.76’
He continues, the person who:
‘…wishes to be restricted in various ways, whether by the discipline of the 
monastery, regimentation of the army, or even by coercion, is not, on that 
account alone, less autonomous.77’
It follows that, where a person authentically and procedurally independently chooses to 
renounce future independence, that choice cannot be criticised on the basis that it is not 
procedurally independent. The person is able to reflect; he or she has done, and has made 
an authentic and independent decision about how he or she wants life to be.
Dworkin maintains that all choices to some extent foreclose other choices, reversibly 
or irreversibly and such foreclosures need not be viewed as forfeitures of autonomy.78 
If autonomy requires substantive independence, it becomes inconsistent with loyalty, 
objectivity, commitment, benevolence and love.79 Consequently, Dworkin argues that 
a conception of substantive autonomy should not have claim to our respect as an ideal.80 
He maintains that what is important about autonomy ‘…is that the commitments and 
73 Ibid 26.
74 Ibid 27.
75 However, others maintain that it is crucial to a procedural account of autonomy that the individual retains 
control over her decisions and actions. They argue that acts and decisions which appear to be independent but 
forgo future independence cannot be justified by recourse to the principle of autonomy. On this basis, one 
cannot defer independent judgment whether to government, moral authority, God or another mere mortal on 
the basis of autonomy. See, for example, R. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (1970 New York: Harper & Row) 
41; J. Rachels, ‘God and Human Attitudes’ 7 (1971) Religious Studies 334; M. Osiel, Obeying Orders, Atrocity, 
Military Discipline and the Law of War (1999 New Jersey: Transaction); R. Rhodes, Genetic Links, Family Ties, 
and Social Bonds: Rights and Responsibilities in the Face of Genetic Knowledge’ 23 (1998) Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 10. It might be argued that this position does not describe procedural autonomy at all but a 
substantive concept of autonomy where a decision whose content is to renounce future independence is not 
autonomous because of an error in the substance of the decision rather than in the procedure.
76 G. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control’ 6 (1976) Hastings Center Report 23, 25; G. Dworkin, The 
Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Chapter 2.
77 G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 18.
78 Ibid 26.
79 Ibid 21.
80 Ibid 21 and 25.
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promises a person makes be ones he views as his, as part of the person he wants to be, so 
that he defines himself via those commitments’.81
Although Harris and Keywood reject the argument that an appeal can be made to the 
principle of autonomy to argue that a knowledgeable refusal of relevant genetic information 
ought to be respected, they concede that there can be legitimate cases of autonomously 
chosen restrictions on autonomy.82 However, they distinguish between autonomously 
chosen restrictions on autonomy which are consistent with autonomy, understood as an 
ethical principle and such choices which are inconsistent with autonomy.83 They contrast 
the monk who enters the monastic order but remains free to leave as an autonomously 
chosen restriction on autonomy, and the person who sells him or herself into slavery as 
a choice which is inconsistent with the idea of autonomy, and cannot be protected by 
appeals to autonomy as a moral principle.84 The monk remains fully autonomous because 
although agreeing to be bound, he is still free to choose.85 Dworkin would not make 
such a distinction because he believes that what is valuable about autonomy is that the 
commitments people makes are ones that they view as their own, as part of the person 
they want to be, so that they define themselves via those commitments. Whether they 
are long or short term, prima facie or absolute, permanent or temporary, is not what 
contributes to their value.86
It is not clear why Harris and Keywood class the choice not to accept genetic 
information about oneself as akin to the example of the slave rather than the monk.87 
People who choose not to receive information are not bound by the original decision 
so that they cannot subsequently ask for the information when and if they want it, or 
when they approach a decision where they feel they want the particular content of the 
information. Moreover, they can still choose to have genetic tests themselves to discover 
more accurate information about their own genetic constitution than that which they 
might discover as a result of information which might be generated based on the test 
taken by a relative.
Dworkin specifically argues that knowledgeable and expressed desires not to know 
medical information about oneself can be justified by an appeal to autonomy:
‘If a patient has knowingly and freely requested of the doctor that he not be 
informed or consulted about his course of treatment then to seek to obtain 
informed consent would itself be a denial of autonomy.88’
Dworkin’s view then is that more knowledge is not always better than less, because 
there are times when we really do not want to know.89 Other commentators agree that 
81 Ibid 26. 
82 J. Harris and K. Keywood, ‘Ignorance, Information and Autonomy’ 22 (2001) Theoretical Medicine 415, 419.
83 Ibid 419.
84 Ibid 420.
85 Ibid 419.
86 G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 26. Contrast 
this view with that of Harris and Keywood regarding when it is possible to autonomously foreclose independence 
in a way which is consistent with autonomy above.
87 As they argue that it does. J. Harris and K. Keywood, ‘Ignorance, Information and Autonomy’ 22 (2001) 
Theoretical Medicine 415, 419–421.
88 G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 118.
89 G. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control’ 6 (1976) Hastings Centre Report 23, 27. 
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the receipt of information is not always required for a person to act autonomously.90 
From this perspective, simply knowing of the potential existence of the particular genetic 
information would be sufficient to make an authentic and procedurally independent 
decision with regard to its acceptance and is sufficient to enable autonomous self-
direction. Subsequently, the content of the decision is irrelevant, so a decision to refuse 
the information can be as autonomous as a decision to accept it.
Although the provision of information is important in English medical law as a 
means of ensuring patient autonomy,91 the law does not require that all potentially relevant 
information is disclosed in order to protect autonomy by way of consent. The tort of 
battery explicitly protects the patient’s autonomy. However, the information disclosure 
threshold in battery is low because the purpose of the action is to protect people against 
unwanted touching. Thus, once the patient is informed in broad terms of the nature of the 
procedure, his or her consent is taken to be effective.92 On the other hand, with respect 
to non-disclosure of medical information, negligence protects people where failure to 
disclose information leads to them run risks which they would not otherwise have run.93 
An action may lie in negligence where the claimant is broadly aware of the nature of 
the treatment (such that an action in battery cannot succeed) and is aggrieved because 
of the failure to disclose or draw sufficient attention to a particular risk inherent in the 
treatment which has then eventuated. However, this does not mean that clinicians must 
disclose every potential risk before a consent will be deemed to be autonomous. Only 
those risks which reasonable physicians would disclose or reasonable patients would want 
to know need94 to be disclosed before a consent is deemed to be real and consequently 
autonomous. Thus, in the context of medical decision making the law finds that patient 
autonomy is protected even though the doctor has not disclosed all potentially relevant 
information to the patient. 
Furthermore, English medical law does allow patients to make choices which 
foreclose future choices if the original choice is authentic and procedurally independent. 
In B v NHS Hospital Trust95 the High Court held that a competent individual can refuse 
medical treatment which will lead to her death, thereby foreclosing any future choices. 
Thus, the competent adult is not subject to the principle of securing an open future96 
which is relied on to justify overriding a child’s current autonomous decision where 
90 R. Andorno, ‘The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach’ 30 (2004) Journal of Medical Ethics 
435; J. Raikka, ‘Freedom and a Right (Not) to Know’ 12 (1998) Bioethics 49, 60; J. Husted, ‘Autonomy and a 
Right Not to Know’ in R. Chadwick, M. Levitt and D. Schickle (eds) The Right to Know and the Right Not to 
Know, (1997 Aldershot: Avebury) 55, 67; G. Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and Behaviour Control’ 6 (1976) Hastings 
Center Report 23; T. Takala, ‘The Right to Genetic Ignorance Confirmed’ 13 (1999) Bioethics 288; L.O. Ursin, 
‘Personal Autonomy and Informed Consent’ 12 (2009) Medicine Healthcare and Philosophy 17.
91 See in particular Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 Lord Hope 161–162.
92 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 QB 432, Bristow J 443.
93 Or, following Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 Would not have run at that time. 
94 Depending on the perspective taken from the line of cases dealing with non-disclosure of risk. The pro-
defendant position taken in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital 
[1985] AC 871 was questioned in Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1998] 48 BMLR 118 there has 
been some development in this area in Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 and Birch v UCL NHS Foundation Trust 
[2008] EWHC 2237 these cases did not deal directly with the standard with regard to the disclosure of the risks 
inherent in a particular treatment and have not apparently displaced the position taken in Sidaway whereby the 
doctor will not be negligent in failing to disclose a risk if other reasonable doctors would not have disclosed that 
risk.
95 Re B (Adult: Refusal of medical Treatment) [2002] 2 FCR 1.
96 J. Feinberg, Freedom and fulfilment: philosophical essays (1992) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
76–98.
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that decision would foreclose the child’s future autonomy. Indeed, in English law it may 
amount to a battery to disrespect a competent adult’s current autonomous decision on 
the basis of the protection of future autonomy.97 Thus, in English medical law autonomy, 
as protected by the requirement of consent, is not conditional on substantive notions of 
rationality. Indeed in Re T Lord Donaldson said:
‘An adult patient who….suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute 
right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to 
choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered. This right 
of choice is not limited to decisions which others might regard as sensible. 
It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational, 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent.98’
This opinion has been repeated with approval on many occasions.99 However, although 
English medical law explicitly stipulates that the law will respect a decision as autonomous 
even if the individual has no reasons for his or her decision, Morgan and Veitch argue 
that despite express statements to the contrary, in the context of medical law, the courts 
do actually require that patients demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that they have 
reasonable reasons for their decision before they will deem that decision rational and 
therefore autonomous.100 They argue that despite the fact that the English courts have 
repeatedly said that in the context of medical treatment the patient’s right to choose or to 
refuse treatment is not limited to decisions which others might regard as sensible, it exists 
notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown 
or even non-existent,101 the assessment of mental capacity and the nature of patients’ 
decisions merge, so individuals must, in fact, explain the reasons for their decisions.102 
They focus on the case of Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)103 to argue that, in 
order to justify her choice, Ms B had to speak of her decision and the reasons behind it. 
Effectively, in the absence of a decision which would objectively be regarded by others 
as rational in and of itself,104 Ms B had to prove to others, in particular the court, that 
the reasons for her decision were rational. Ms B had to talk of her situation and the level 
of suffering she was experiencing and convince others that, within the context of her 
suffering, reasons existed upon which a rational decision to pursue the end of her life 
could be formed. In essence, the fact that she has reasonable reasons for an apparently 
irrational decision overrode initial doubts about the rationality of her apparently odd 
decision and led the court to respect her decision as autonomous, on the basis that it was 
rational because of the reasons behind it. 
97 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 FCR 1.where an award was made for the battery which 
occurred when Ms B received medical treatment which was against her wishes.
98 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 Lord Donaldson 102. 
99 See, for example, Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] FLR 426, Butler-Sloss 
100 D. Morgan and K. Veitch, 26 (2004) ‘Being Ms B: B, Autonomy and the Nature of Legal Regulation’ Sydney 
Law Review 107. 
101 See, in particular Re T (Adult: refusal of treatment) 1993 Fam 95, Lord Donaldson, 102; Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and Others 1985 AC 871, Lord Templeman, 904; 
Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, Butler-Sloss LJ, 432.
102 D. Morgan and K. Veitch, 26 (2004) ‘Being Ms B: B, Autonomy and the Nature of Legal Regulation’ Sydney 
Law Review 107.
103 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 FCR 1.
104 Because it was a decision which rejected medical advice and would result in death.
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Thus, like Dworkin, in ensuring the protection of autonomy, the English courts 
are concerned that medical decision-making is the result of rational procedure, in that 
decisions are voluntary and that the individual can show that he or she has reflected 
on his or her decision and accepts the motivation for it, rather than on preconceived 
end points which rationality might dictate.105 Thus the rationality of medical decisions 
in English law is assessed by the criteria of rational procedure as opposed to a particular 
end point which might be demanded on the basis of substantive rational values (the 
way decisions which would lead to the end of one’s life might be difficult to describe 
as rational from the sanctity of life perspective). Given that substantive, as opposed to 
procedural, rationality is not a condition of autonomous medical decision-making in 
English law, it might seem odd for the courts to rely the substantively rational value of 
universal acceptance of relevant information to argue that a person’s decision not to know 
genetic information about him or herself is not autonomous. Indeed, currently the law 
would not enquire into the rationality of a subsequent decision made on the basis of the 
unwanted information in determining its autonomy. Given this it might seem awkward if 
the law thought it necessary to enquire into the rationality of the decision not to have the 
information before they would deem that decision autonomous.106 From this perspective, 
the idea of rationality as a condition of autonomy which is more likely to be acceptable 
to the law in the realm of genetic information disclosure is procedural rationality rather 
than substantive rationality. It would follow that, where an authentic and procedurally 
independent decision to refuse genetic information is ignored, the individual’s interest in 
autonomy is interfered with. 
If negligence were imbued with recognition of breach of autonomy as harm, it 
would follow that health professionals are under a duty not to breach the interest in 
autonomy via the disclosure of expressly unwanted genetic information.107 Furthermore, 
as part of health care professionals’ duty to protect autonomy, it is arguable that they have 
a corresponding duty to take full advantage of a person’s capability to be autonomous.108 
Indeed such a duty is imposed on a health professional seeking to obtain consent from 
a person whose capacity is in doubt in the Mental Capacity Act 2005.109 It might be 
argued then that, where possible, health professionals are obligated to raise the profile of 
unknown genetic unknowns so that people have the chance to know that there may be a 
relevant unknown and therefore exercise autonomy in deciding whether or not to know 
what remains unknown.
Conclusion
In considering when the interest in not knowing genetic information might be justified 
on the basis of autonomy, this article has distinguished between unknown unknowns 
105 D. Morgan and K. Veitch ‘Being Ms B; B, Autonomy and the Nature of Legal Regulation’ (2004) 26 Sydney 
Law Review 107. 
106 This is based on the premise that the decision to refuse the information is made with sufficient information. 
In each case we assume that the person has the information required to make an autonomous decision. In this 
case why should decisions to refuse information be assessed on the basis of rationality but not decisions to refuse 
treatment based on that information? Both have the potential to lead to the limitation of autonomy in the future 
because of a diminishment of the ability to be self-determining in relation to future decisions. 
107 A deep examination of how the legal duty of care might function in this context can be found above at p 3–7.
108 Thank you to Dr Mark Taylor for raising this point.
109 s 1 (3). 
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and known unknowns. With regard to the former, where there is no opportunity to 
be self-determining with regard to the receipt of relevant genetic information, it is 
argued that only disclosures of relevant unknown information can be justified on the 
basis of autonomy. This is because the opportunity for self-determination has not arisen, 
so no choice can be made prior to disclosure. Autonomy justifies disclosure because 
this maximises future opportunities for self determination where contemporaneous self-
determination is impossible. 
However, where an explicit wish not to know has been made, the imposition of 
a duty not to disclose can be justified on the basis of autonomy. Where the decision 
is authentic and procedurally independent such that it represents an exercise of self-
determination, the fact that the decision is a refusal of information which might negate 
future self-determination does not mean that the decision is not autonomous. It is only 
if autonomous decisions are conditional upon substantive rationality, in that they are 
required to accept rather than refuse relevant information, that refusals cannot be justified 
in the basis of autonomy. This is the kind of rational autonomy that Harris and Keywood 
and Rhodes rely on to deny that autonomy can support a refusal of information about 
oneself. However, English law does not adhere to this conception of substantive rational 
autonomy. As long as the relevant procedural requirements regarding understanding 
and absence of undue influence are present, English law allows people to autonomously 
restrict their autonomy. Given this, English law is capable of recognising decisions to 
refuse genetic information as autonomous, even when they concern relevant information. 
However, as argued here, the law would have to take the significant step of recognising 
interference with autonomy as harm110 if it were to provide a remedy for explicitly 
unwanted disclosures of genetic information in the tort of negligence. 
Victoria Chico*
110 It might be possible to bring a claim which would currently be recognised if one suffered medically recognised 
psychiatric harm because of the disclosure of the unwanted information. 
* Lecturer in Law, University of Sheffield. My grateful thanks go to Dr Mark Taylor, the anonymous reviewers 
and the editors for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. All errors are my own.
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